INTRODUCTION

Studying Incentives in the Lab
Incentive theory plays a crucial role in the study of economic phenomena and is a natural candidate for extensive experimental investigation. As a result, the field of experimental labor economics (Charness and Kuhn, 2011 ) has emerged to test many of the predictions that have been generated by incentive and contract theories (Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005) . These experimental protocols have, however, left aside the study of on-thejob leisure activities which unarguably constitute an important part of the work environment (Malachowski, 2005) . In this paper, we propose to fill this gap by integrating on-the-job leisure into the evaluation of incentive effects in the laboratory.
From a methodological standpoint, the inclusion of on-the-job leisure activities in laboratory experiments may help attenuate active participation, an issue raised by Lei, Noussair and Plott (2001) in the context of experimental asset markets. Specific details of an experiment protocol, such as availability of alternatives to focal "work", might encourage or fail to encourage subjects to actively perform effortful work. For example, subjects may engage actively in a focal work task because of expectations, rewards, and lack of desirable alternatives.
When desirable alternatives are present, active participation in effortful work may be traded off to some degree, revealing subtle incentive effects such as from small shifts in wage or manipulations of incentive schemes. We suspect that active participation has previously been an issue because, despite predictions that individual incentives should outperform team incentives (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Holmström, 1982) , several published studies, and perhaps even more unpublished studies, have failed to observe such differences (van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) .
The Real-Leisure Alternative
We investigated the effects of providing a leisure alternative on subjects' performance in a real-effort work task by either allowing or restricting Internet access during the experiment. We considered a real-effort mental arithmetic (summation) task in the spirit of previous laboratory experiments (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk, 2009; Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) . 1 We manipulated the incentive setting by rewarding work performance according to either an individual pay or team pay scheme.
We used Internet browsing to represent on-the-job "real-leisure" 2 because it is a growing and popular on-the-job leisure activity and a representative feature of the workplace. The availability of on-the-job Internet access has increased, due in part to most Americans now owning a smartphone capable of Internet browsing and less subject to employee usage restrictions (Smith, 2013) . According to a 2005 study by American Online and Salary.com, employees spent about 26% of their time on activities unrelated to their work (Malachowski, 2005) . Almost half of this time was spent browsing the Internet. Also, the Internet is frequently browsed by and widely available to university students (our subject pool), providing them with a wide range of activities (Jones et al., 2009 ).
Previous studies have proposed alternative experimental designs to moderate active participation in experiments. For example, Mohnen, Pokorny and Sliwka (2008) gave subjects the option to take a 25-second time-out during which they were not able to work on the counting task and for which they were paid 0.10€. While subjects frequently engage in pleasurable activity during their breaks (e.g. socializing, browsing the Internet), the time-out setting investigated by
Mohnen and colleagues rewarded subjects for taking breaks characterized by inactivity. Contrary to these designs with "abstract" leisure, in our environment we expect heterogeneity in derived utility from leisure (here proxied by internet access). However, Internet browsing, by offering an unprecedented range of leisure options, reduces the heterogeneity in the value of leisure compared to other "real leisure" alternatives such as giving subjects access to selected magazines. Also, the advantage of this implementation is that subjects can choose to engage in leisure activity -a more representative feature of the real workplace.
In line with the real-effort literature we argue that a real-leisure option cannot be instantiated simply as a decision for a monetary alternative. For example, workers who may be reluctant to steal money from an employer or firm may still be willing to spend time browsing optimization problems (Dickinson and Villeval, 2008; Montmarquette et al., 2004; van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001) , typing (Dickinson, 1999) or mailing tasks (Carpenter, Matthews and Schirm, 2010; Falk and Ichino, 2006) . 2 Evidence from neuroscience supports an association between rewarding Internet activities and dopamine (Koepp et al., 1998; Tamir & Mitchell, 2012) , supporting the notion that Internet browsing is a "real", not abstract, form of leisure. Furthermore, dopamine levels across different parts of the brain have been shown to influence one's work ethic (Treadway et al., 2012) , suggesting the mechanism by which real-leisure alternatives may interfere with realeffort.
the Internet while paid for being "on-the-job". They may justify Internet browsing as part of their legitimate search for valuable work information or they may consider paid work to include some real-leisure "breaks". Internet browsing on the job has been shown to damage employees' productivity (Young, 2005; 2006) and incurred U.S. corporations at least $85 billion in yearly costs (Alder, Noel and Ambrose, 2006) . Consideration of leisure-related issues in the experimental economics literature dates back to Dickinson's (1999) labor supply study in which subjects working on a typing task were provided an option to leave the laboratory whenever they had achieved a certain output level. Quitting options have since been introduced into subsequent studies on minimum wages and workfare (e.g. Huffman, 2007, Abeler et al., 2011) .
Given the lack of control over subjects' activities and desired alternatives outside the laboratory, heterogeneity in quitting behaviors has been difficult to interpret. Quitting options are also not representative of the typical workplace regime as salaried employees in most organizations are required to comply with a minimum number of completed work hours per pay period.
Unlike previous experiments, our design embeds on-the-job leisure alternatives into the work environment, allowing the measurement of each subject's time allocation to leisure or work activities. While two related experimental studies (Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Charness, Masclet and Villeval, 2010) have introduced on-the-job leisure alternatives by giving subjects access to magazines (for browsing or reading), they have not reported effects of on-thejob leisure activity on subjects' performance.
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To our knowledge, ours is the first experimental work to have measured subjects' time allocation to real-effort work tasks or on-the-job leisure and to have analyzed the effects of access to leisure on subjects' performance. We studied the effect of on-the-job leisure in two of the most popular incentive schemes: individual pay and team pay (e.g. Prendergast, 1999; Lazear, 2000; Hamilton, Nickerson and Owan, 2003 performance was different across payment schemes. The availability of Internet browsing reduced production significantly under team pay while it did not reduce production under individual pay. In addition, we observed that incentive effects (measured as the difference in production between the individual pay and the team pay treatments) were more pervasive when
Internet browsing was available. In the presence of Internet browsing, incentive effects were significant across all periods of the experiment while no incentive effects were found in the first two periods of the experiment when Internet browsing was not included in the design. This suggests that incentive effects may be sensitive to real-leisure alternatives such as Internet browsing and that previous real-effort experiments lacking this feature may have failed to uncover incentive effects which are reasonable to expect in the workplace.
EXPERIMENTAL ENVIRONMENT
We developed a framework in which subjects could undertake a real-effort task, while being able to browse the Internet.
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The Work Task
Adapted from previous research using mental arithmetic (summation) tasks (e.g., Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009) , the work task required real-effort in the form of mental concentration (because it makes strong demands on working memory (see Chase and Ericsson, 1982) ). By using a long, repetitive and effortful task we ensured that individual performance was mostly driven by real (mental) effort considerations. The duration of our task, 5 periods of 20 minutes each, as well as its intricacy were considerably greater than in previous real-effort experiments that have reported the use of summation tasks (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Bartling, Fehr, Maréchal and Schunk, 2009; Eriksson, Poulsen and Villeval, 2009; Dohmen and Falk, 2011) . The task required subjects to sum up tables of 36 numbers without using a pen, scratch paper, or calculator (see Figure 1 ). Each table had six rows and six columns of randomlygenerated numbers from zero to ten. Before providing the grand total in the bottom-right cell, subjects had to provide separate subtotals for each of the 12 rows and columns. Calculating these subtotals did not directly generate earnings but could help subjects compute the grand total. A correct grand total answer increased production by 40 cents while 20 cents were subtracted if the answer was incorrect. 5 After completing each table, subjects learned whether their answer was correct and what their accumulated production value was. At the end of each period, subjects learned the total amount of money generated on the work task by all subjects of their group. At any point during the experiment, all subjects in the treatments with Internet availability could switch from the work task to Internet browsing, and vice versa. Subjects could spend as much or as little time as they wanted on the various activities, each of which was undertaken on a separate screen. To switch activities, subjects simply chose the corresponding option from a drop-down menu at the bottom-right of their screens.
Internet Browsing
In the "Internet" treatments where the leisure alternative was available, if subjects chose to browse the Internet, the work task window was replaced by an Internet window (embedded in the software; see Figure 2 ). Within the bounds of university policy, subjects could use the Internet however they liked, including email, instant messaging, and social networking. Their confidentiality was assured and maintained, but the software tracked the exact amount of time spent on each activity. Subjects did not receive feedback regarding others' use of the Internet.
Although subjects could not complete the work task while browsing the Internet, switching between tasks was quick and easy. Subjects were told in the instructions that using any internetbased devices, or calculators, to sum up numbers was not allowed. 
Click Pay
In addition to the activities described above, subjects could click on a yellow box that appeared at the bottom of their screen every 25 seconds, independent of whether the subject was currently working on the task or browsing the Internet. Each time subjects clicked on the yellow box they earned 5 cents. The earnings on this task were intended to represent a fixed wage of $12 which was paid in addition to the performance pay.
TREATMENTS, HYPOTHESES AND PROCEDURES
Treatments
We conducted four treatments as part of a 22 design in which we varied the availability of the Internet ("Internet" or "No Internet") and the type of performance-based incentive scheme ("individual pay" or "team pay"). In the individual pay treatments, subjects were rewarded on the work task according to their individual production. Under team pay, the total production of the group was equally distributed among subjects so that each of them received 10% of the total production of the 10 group members in each session.
Hypotheses
We derive our hypotheses from the moral-hazard in teams model introduced by Holmström (1982) . We consider N workers producing a total output which depends on each Therefore, if the cost of effort and the utility of leisure are sufficiently high compared with the marginal productivity of effort , Internet availability will reduce subjects'
production. This condition is more likely to be satisfied under team pay since .
Additionally, the decrease in production due to Internet browsing should be more pervasive where the utility of leisure is greater.
6 Kandel and Lazear (1992) assume nonseparability in effort so as to justify the existence of partnerships and eliminate the possibility of self-employment. In this paper, we do not aim at justifying the existence of partnerships and simply assume separability of the utility function in effort so as to match our experimental design more closely. 7 For simplicity of exposition, we express the utility of leisure (Internet browsing) as the opportunity cost of not browsing the Internet ( ). 8 We derive these calculations in Appendix A.
Hypothesis 2 (Incentive Scheme Effects and Internet Availability)
When Internet is [not] 
Procedures
Two-hundred forty three individuals were recruited from a subject pool at a major U.S.
university to participate in the current study in exchange for money. The experiments took place between December 2010 and May 2011 with treatments randomly assigned across 26 experiment sessions (see Table 1 ). Subjects were told that the set of computerized instructions were identical for all the subjects. Subjects had 20 minutes to read the instructions (see Appendix C), with a timer displayed on a large screen at the front of the lab. 11 Experimental sessions lasted on average two hours and thirty minutes.
At the end of the experiment, subjects were paid their earnings in cash, rounded up to the nearest quarter. Individual earnings at the end of the experiment were computed as the sum of 9 Technical issues prevented the analysis of one of the sessions in the treatment with individual pay and no Internet. 10 All sessions involved groups of ten subjects except two sessions with 8 subjects in the treatment with individual pay and Internet, and two sessions with 8 subjects and three sessions with 7 subjects in the treatment with individual pay and no Internet. 11 None of the subject asked questions or requested extra time.
the earnings in the five periods. Subjects earned on average $26.94 (including the $7 show-up fee).
RESULTS
Aggregate measures
We define production as the monetary amount generated by a subject's answers on the work task divided by the reward for each correct answer (40¢). Production can thus be interpreted as the total number of correct tables completed by a given subject discounted by the (weighted) number of incorrect answers. In Table 2 , we report descriptive statistics of subjects' total production from the work task in the five periods of the experiment, across treatments. Under team pay, subjects' total production was significantly lower in the treatment in which Internet was available than in the treatment in which it was not, whether we used parametric or non-parametric clustered tests. Clustered tests were used to control for the fact that individual production in a given session may have been affected by group production. 12 These findings are in line with Hypothesis 1 according to which the availability of Internet reduces production under team pay as long as . Under individual pay, even though average (median) production was 11.0% (6.8%) lower when Internet was available than when it was not, the difference was not statistically significant. This is consistent with our model when , in which case the level of effort is maximal whether Internet is available or not. The fact that 12 This correction was especially relevant for the treatments with team pay in which case the contributions of other group members, displayed on a subject's screen at the end of each period, may have affected an individual's motivation to work. This may have led subjects to free ride whenever they observed an increase in group production as is the case in standard public good games (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey, and Corgnet et al. (2011) for further analyses).
Internet effects were significant under team pay while they were not significant under individual pay relates to the fact that Internet usage was more pronounced under team pay (28.5% of subjects' available time) than under individual pay (11.9%) (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests:
p < .001 and p = .008, respectively).
Intensive Internet users produced significantly less than other subjects, regardless of the treatment, stressing the disruptive effect of using the Internet. In particular, the probability of completing a given table correctly was negatively affected by switching between the work task and the Internet and by time spent browsing (see Appendix D for the statistical analysis). Also, production levels were negatively correlated with the time subjects spent on the Internet. The correlation coefficients were equal to -0.727 (p < 0.001) and -0.582 (p < 0.001) under pay and individual pay, respectively.
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We summarize our findings as follows.
RESULT 1. (Internet effects)
Under team pay, subjects produced significantly less in the treatment in which Internet was available than in the treatment in which it was not. Under individual pay, the availability of
Internet had no significant effect on subjects' production.
In the treatments in which Internet was available, subjects produced on average 41.7% more under individual pay than under team pay (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests: p = .001 and p = .005, respectively). Similarly, in the absence of Internet subjects produced 25.9% more under individual pay than under team pay (Clustered t-test and rank-sum tests: p = .012 and p = .014 , respectively). These findings are summarized below.
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RESULT 2. (Incentive effects)
Regardless of Internet availability, subjects produced significantly more under individual pay than under team pay. 13 We find similar results using a panel regression of individual production with robust standard deviations for session clusters and controlling for a period trend, in which internet coefficients are negative and significant for both treatments (p's < 0.001).
14 We confirm these findings in a difference-in-difference regression of total production with robust standard deviations for session clusters. We find that the coefficient for the Team Pay dummy is negative and significant (p = 0.002). However the Internet dummy and the interaction dummy, although negative, are not significant (p = 0.152 and p = 0.489).
In addition to engaging in the work task and Internet browsing, subjects could obtain earnings from the low-effort clicking task. No significant differences in the clicking task earnings were observed across treatments (see Table B1 in Appendix B).
Production dynamics
We measured time allocations to Internet browsing and work effort over the five periods of our experiment to study the dynamics of production. The evolution of production is particularly relevant in our setting given that fatigue and boredom are likely to arise when completing the real-effort task repeatedly. Consistently, Internet usage surged from period three onwards (see team pay is consistent with findings in public good games, in which contributions are found to decrease over time (see Ledyard (1995) for a survey). 15 We observed a positive trend in production for each of the four treatments (see Table B2 in Appendix B), consistent with learning effects in repeated mental calculation tasks noted in the literature (e.g. see Charness and Campbell, 1988) . The dynamics of production differ, however, across treatments as is illustrated in Figure 3 below. Under individual pay, the treatment in which Internet was available and the treatment in which it was not led to similar production levels in the first two periods. However, from period three onwards subjects produced relatively more in the treatment in which Internet was not available. A similar pattern of production was observed under team pay incentives (see right panel in Figure 3 ). These observations suggest that the effect of Internet availability is particularly pronounced after period 2, when Internet usage becomes more prevalent (see Figure   4 below). Consequently, we proceed by comparing the Internet and No Internet treatments in the first two periods of the experiment and in the last three periods separately, for each incentive scheme (see Table 3 ). 
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Under individual pay, the negative effect of Internet browsing was significant in the second part of the experiment while it was not in the first part of the experiment (see Dummy Internet in Table 3 ). This finding suggests that the effect of introducing a real-leisure alternative to the work task is likely to be more pronounced when the work task is sufficiently long. In our model, Internet browsing does not impact production whenever the cost of effort is low enough ( ) since then subjects exert maximal effort regardless of Internet availability. However, as fatigue emerges in the second part of the experiment, the cost of effort is likely to rise which may imply that . In that case, our model predicts that Internet browsing will affect production negatively in line with our empirical findings. In the case of team pay and unlike the case of individual pay, the negative effect of Internet availability was observed across all periods of the experiment. The fact that internet effects were observed in the first part of the experiment under team pay while they failed to be observed under individual pay is consistent with our model as long as and . We summarize our findings in Result 3. Regarding incentive effects, significant differences in production levels between individual and team pay were only observed in the second part of the experiment in the case in which
RESULT 3. (Internet effects are dynamic)
Internet was not available (see Dummy Team Pay for no Internet Treatments in Table 3 ). In the case in which Internet was available, however, production was significantly higher under individual pay than under team pay across all periods of the experiment (see Dummy Team Pay for Internet Treatments in Table 3 ). As a result, in the presence of a real-leisure alternative to the work task, incentive effects are more likely to be detected in shorter and less effortful experiments where they might not be otherwise. We summarize this in Result 4. 
APPENDIX D
We show that using the Internet was disruptive. For example, those subjects who switched back and forth between the Internet and the task were more likely to complete a table incorrectly.
In Table D1 , we show the results of a Probit regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes value one if the table was correctly solved, and zero otherwise. We first observe that the probability of correctly completing a table is lower when subjects have already completed more tables (Table number) . We also control for the time that subjects spent to complete a table,
discounted by the time they were on the Internet (Effective time), and observe that those who took more time to complete a table were more likely to make mistakes. In Regression 1 we also control for a dummy (Switching) that takes value 1 if the subject switched (at least once) to the Internet screen before completing the table. In Regression 2 we control for the time that subjects spent on the Internet (Time on Internet). In Regression 3 we control for both variables. We find that browsing the Internet as well as switching back and forth between the Internet and the task screens decreased the probability of completing a table correctly. 
